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Abstract Opinion polls suggest that the public value their privacy, with
majorities calling for greater control of their data. However, individuals
continue to use online services which place their personal information
at risk, comprising a Privacy Paradox. Previous work has analysed this
phenomenon through after-the-fact comparisons, but not studied disclos-
ure behaviour during questioning. We physically surveyed UK cities to
study how the British public regard privacy and how perceptions differ
between demographic groups. Through analysis of optional data disclos-
ure, we empirically examined whether those who claim to value their
privacy act privately with their own data. We found that both opin-
ions and self-reported actions have little effect on disclosure, with over
99% of individuals revealing private data needlessly. We show that not
only do individuals act contrary to their opinions, they disclose informa-
tion needlessly even whilst describing themselves as private. We believe
our findings encourage further analysis of data disclosure, as a means of
studying genuine privacy behaviour.
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1 Introduction
Privacy principles have been present throughout human history, with the An-
cient Greek philosopher Socrates drawing distinctions between the “outer” and
“inner” self [19]. Warren and Brandeis’ Right to be Let Alone [33] placed privacy
within the Western democratic consciousness, and across much of the world it is
clearly established as both a legal and a human right [29]. However, whilst eph-
emeral utterances were once lost in the ether, now all our electronic communica-
tions are logged, stored and used for later processing. With today’s spontaneous
conversations persisting decades into the future, privacy is at a crossroads.
Previous studies have suggested individuals care about their privacy. The
Pew Research Center [28] found that 86% of surveyed US citizens reported taking
steps to remain private online, whilst 88% in a UK poll claimed to value their
privacy [32]. Despite these self-reported surveys, many examples speak to the
contrary. Another Pew poll found that 74% of US respondents used location-
based services on their smartphones, allowing their movements to be tracked in
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real-time [35]. Employees are dismissed due to embarrassing online disclosures
[21], burglars survey social networking sites to select their targets, and the use
of various technologies leads to an increasing number of privacy risks [24]. [5].
Later research [7] found that individuals valued their online browsing history
at only e7, the price of a fast-food meal. We are presented with the “Privacy
Paradox” [3], where individuals claim to value privacy but do little to actively
protect it.
The novelty of this paper is to examine the paradox empirically, compar-
ing what individuals claim about their privacy actions with their data disclosure
behaviour. Previous research [23] has taken a two-phase approach, judging parti-
cipants’ actions to be less private than their reported intentions. Other work [17]
questioned individuals on their privacy perceptions, before finding they unwisely
judged user interfaces. However, these privacy evaluations were distinct from
initial questioning, with little research empirically assessing behaviour during
replies. Culnan [12] discovered many demographic factors might influence pri-
vacy concern, including age, wealth and education level. However, the majority
of previous work has been conducted in the US, with British privacy perceptions
rarely considered. In contrast, our research studied how the UK public perceive
privacy, how privately do they act, and which privacy-protective technologies
do they use. Through this, we examined how different demographic groups view
privacy, and whether those who claim to value their privacy act privately with
their own data.
In achieving these goals, we first surveyed existing work on the Privacy Para-
dox. Conventionally, interpretations are split into two groups: opinion-oriented
and behaviour-oriented [2]. The former considers the disparity due to a lack
of user education, whilst the latter judges individuals to exchange privacy for
convenience. Whereas Acquisti [1] justified user actions through the behavioural
economic theory of bounded rationality, Jensen et al. [17] attributed the dispar-
ity to individuals’ misjudging their own abilities. Next, we built on the position
paper by Williams [34] by conducting a physical survey across several cities in
the UK. We analysed our collected data on three levels: firstly, to study how the
British public view privacy; secondly, to investigate how different demographic
groups regard the topic; and thirdly, to examine whether those who claim to
value privacy act privately with their own data.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the
literature concerning privacy definitions, demographic studies and the Privacy
Paradox. Section 3 then describes our research questions, the methodology of our
physical survey, and how we designed against response biases. Section 4 continues
by presenting our survey results, performing data analyses, and discussing our
findings. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5 and consider possibilities
for further work.
2 Literature Review
Before we discuss privacy in greater detail, we should produce a clear defini-
tion. Clarke [10] found distinctions between information privacy, media privacy,
interception privacy, and bodily privacy, with Burgoon [6] also regarding an in-
formational privacy component important. For the purposes of our work, any
reference to privacy concerns information privacy, i.e. “the interest an individual
has in controlling, or at least significantly influencing, the handling of data about
themselves” [10]. This is due to the fact we are studying data distribution rather
than more societal interactions.
Previous research has compared demographic groups based on their privacy
opinions. Whilst Han and Maclaurin [15] found online privacy concern gener-
ally increased with age, other work considered whether younger people might
be better at protecting themselves due to their greater knowledge of modern
technology [4]. Sheehan [30] found women to be more concerned than men, al-
though other studies [8] have shown that male users tend to falsify their personal
data more frequently. As previously mentioned, Culnan [12] discovered several
demographic factors which might influence concern for privacy, including age,
wealth and education level. All this previous research was undertaken in the US,
whilst our work studies whether demographic factors have an influence in the
UK. Furthermore, whilst polls are generally undertaken online, reducing parti-
cipation from certain demographic groups [13], our survey was conducted in an
accessible manner on public streets.
The Privacy Paradox has been analysed in a variety of contexts. Barnes [3]
studied the teenage use of social networking sites, finding that whilst teens freely
disclose their personal information, they still express outrage when their privacy
is invaded. Norberg et al. [23] questioned participants on their willingness to dis-
close data, before requesting the same information several weeks later through
market researchers. They discovered that regardless of the type of information,
the disclosure level was far greater than what respondents had initially claimed.
Motiwalla et al. [22] used an auction scenario to analyse disclosure behaviours,
finding stated concerns to be a poor predictor of future actions. Although these
studies illuminate the Privacy Paradox, analyses are performed after-the-fact
and therefore other variables, such as changes in context [20], could have an
effect. Acquisti [1] considered bounded rationality, finding that users might fo-
cus on short-term gratification, without considering the long-term privacy risks.
Syverson [31] rejected that individuals act irrationally, claiming they weigh costs
against benefits in a sensible manner, with this echoed by findings of a Janu-
ary 2016 US poll [27]. Although economic analyses are enlightening, we decided
to investigate the matter empirically to compare opinions with actions. In his
comprehensive 2015 literature review, Kokolakis [18] urged future research to
make use of data rather than relying on self-reported claims. We combined these
approaches, comparing reported opinions with empirical disclosure behaviour.
3 Research Methodology
We explored three main research questions (RQ) through our survey on the
Privacy Paradox. These are as follows:
1. How do the UK public regard online privacy, and which privacy-protective
technologies do they use?
2. How do demographic groups in the UK differ from each other in their per-
ceptions of privacy?
3. Do those who claim to value their privacy act privately when given the option
to disclose sensitive demographic data?
We undertook a physical survey of the UK’s general adult population, choos-
ing London, Birmingham, Cardiff and Oxford for study due to their varied loc-
ations and differing population sizes (8.6M, 1M, 350K, and 154K, respectively).
We began preparing the survey several months before the study, both through
acquiring university ethical approval and to allow for an iterative design pro-
cess. We also received explicit authorisation from the various city councils to
conduct our research. The demographic queries, survey questions and options
for reply were updated frequently before the form was finalised. We then under-
took a pilot study for one day in Oxford to ensure that the questionnaire was
appropriate for our research. The final survey was undertaken in August 2015,
with participants asked how they value privacy, how they view their own level
of privacy-consciousness, and which tools they use to protect themselves.
We divided the questionnaire into five sections: Required Demographics, Op-
tional Demographics, Opinions, Actions, and Informed Consent. The Required
Demographics included gender and age range and were used to study how dif-
ferent sections of UK society regard online privacy. The Optional Demographics
allowed empirical analysis of data disclosure and comprised of marital status,
employer and Twitter handle. Participants could either choose to answer these
questions or select “Prefer Not To Say”, with only the presence or absence of
this data taken into consideration. The Opinion section asked participants to rate
their agreement with privacy statements (for example, “privacy is of importance
to me”) on a five-point Likert scale from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Dis-
agree”. We requested these opinions before individuals reported their actions, as
a means of reducing priming effects and social desirability bias [14]. The final
opinion asked participants to self-evaluate their own level of privacy, and this
was compared with their reported actions and disclosure behaviour.
In the Actions section, participants were questioned on their online habits (for
example, “how often do you share your location on social networking sites?”),
with a six-point Likert scale ranging from “Always” to “Never” with “Unsure”
and “N/A” included. We chose this frequency scale both to reduce the risk of
acquiescence bias [9], where participants just agree with the researcher, and to re-
flect that individuals might protect information differently in different contexts.
Both the Opinion and Action questions were designed to be neutral to also re-
duce this acquiescence risk. The Informed Consent section notified participants
of study purpose and redressal procedures, important matters for performing
ethical research. We used a chocolate bar reward to incentivise participation,
and whilst some individuals might complete the questionnaire just for personal
gain, we found most respondents were interested in providing their opinion.
Several risks exist from surveying the general public in a self-reporting man-
ner, and we remained cognisant of possible response biases. Non-response bias
[16] could have been encountered if those opposed to disclosing data therefore
avoided our survey. Whilst this was considered, we assured participants that their
data would be stored securely and that the survey had passed ethical approval
procedures. Social desirability bias could influence participants to exaggerate
their privacy concern, and therefore we used the amount of disclosed data as a
proxy for privacy behaviour. Some respondents might provide further informa-
tion for completeness or in reaction to demand characteristics [25]. Furthermore,
privacy behaviour is contextualised [20] and individuals might disclose more data
knowing that the survey is for academic purposes and conducted through the
University of Oxford. However, participants were instructed that these fields
were not mandatory and the “Prefer Not To Say” options offered a simple al-
ternative. Respondents might claim to be using privacy-protective technologies
falsely, either due to misconceptions or to appear privacy-conscious. Jensen et
al. [17] found that individuals often claimed to understand a technology, but
then were unable to answer simple questions about it. To reduce this risk, we
included the fictitious PrivBrowse product, in the technique of Presser et al.
[26], so participants who state they use this tool could be highlighted. Whilst
false data is often discounted from datasets, we study PrivBrowse responses to
evaluate respondents’ perceptions of privacy-protective technologies.
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 Participants
We collected a total of 112 physical responses from across the UK, with 94% of
the participants identifying themselves as UK residents. Our gender ratio was
reasonably balanced, 57% female and 43% male, and at least 9% of participants
came from each age bracket. More than 10% also came from each education
level other than PhD, suggesting a varied cross-section of the British public.
Our survey greatly benefits from being physically-conducted, as online polls
can reduce participation from certain demographic groups [13]. 71% reported to
use computers as part of their job, highlighting how ubiquitous technology has
become in the UK.
4.2 Analytical Techniques
We first used Cronbach’s alpha (α) to measure our scale reliability, with coeffi-
cients in excess of 0.7 considered to represent internal consistency. Fortunately,
our α = 0.81 and therefore fulfilled this requirement.
We utilised a number of techniques to study correlation and differentiate
between datasets. We used Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient (ρ) to meas-
ure two-variable linear correlation from 1 for total positive correlation to 0 for no
correlation to -1 for total negative correlation. This technique is used for ordinal
data, which we receive from ranking our Likert scale responses numerically. We
studied the p-value to assess the probability the result is due to chance, with a
p < 0.05 representing statistical significance.
To determine whether two datasets were significantly different from each
other, we used the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test for our ordinal opinion data
and the two-tailed Student’s t-test otherwise. We again required p < 0.05 to
indicate differences were probabilistically not due to chance.
In investigating our research questions (RQ), we studied five variables: the
mean amount of data disclosed (0–3), the mean privacy opinions (1–5), the mean
online privacy opinions (1–5), the mean privacy self-evaluations (1–5), and the
mean self-reported action scores (1–4). This action score ranged from most to
least private, with “Unsure” and “N/A” answers deemed to represent a neutral
response. In each case, the lower the value of the variable, the more ‘private’
a participant was considered to be. For the remainder of the paper, we use x¯
to denote mean values, ρ for correlation coefficients and include p-values when
differences are statistically significant.
4.3 RQ1: Privacy Opinions and Protective Technologies
In answering our first research question, we analysed respondents’ opinions and
actions. We found participants overwhelmingly claim to be concerned about
their privacy. 92% reported they found privacy important to them, 69% strongly
agreeing with the statement compared to 2% in disagreement. Similarly, 93%
agreed online privacy was important, with less than 3% disagreeing with the
statement. Participants were more reserved over self-evaluations of their own
privacy, but 81% still agreed that they acted privately. We now compare these
opinions with reported actions to investigate the Privacy Paradox.
Whilst the complete list of action results are shown below in Table 1, we
focus on privacy-protective technology use, looking to address our first research
question. Not even half of the respondents claimed to clean their web browser
history frequently, which is worrying considering less than 2% were unsure of
their answer. With the retention of browsing histories and cookies potentially
enabling online tracking, this could place a large number of individuals at risk.
42% of participants had not used protective browser plug-ins, despite the pop-
ularity of ad-blocking software. Data encryption is applied rarely, with only 6%
of respondents always performing the task. This comes in contrast to the 66%
who admitted to never encrypting at all. Less than 5% of participants claimed to
use Tor1 frequently, with 75% having never used the software. Anecdotally, one
respondent reported that the technology was used by criminals, and this stigma
might explain its lack of common usage. Despite efforts to increase PGP2 usabil-
1 https://www.torproject.org/
2 https://www.gnupg.org/
Action Always Often Rarely Never Unsure N/A
How often do you clean your Internet browser’s
history?
15.2 31.3 25.9 23.2 1.8 2.7
How often do you use Internet browser plug-ins/
extensions to protect your privacy?
15.2 21.4 12.5 42.9 5.4 2.7
How often do you encrypt data on your
computer?
6.3 8.9 15.2 66.1 0.9 2.7
How often do you store unencrypted data
within a cloud provider such as Dropbox?
17.9 16.1 13.4 44.5 1.8 5.4
How often do you share public posts on social
networking sites such as Facebook?
17.9 18.8 17.0 25.9 0.9 19.6
How often do you share your location on social
networking sites?
3.6 10.7 29.5 36.6 0 19.6
How often do you use Tor for your web
browsing?
1.8 2.7 7.1 75.9 7.1 5.4
How often do you use PrivBrowse for your web
browsing?
0 6.3 1.8 82.1 5.4 4.4
How often do you use encryption tools for your
emails?
7.1 8.9 4.5 72.3 3.6 3.6
How often do you read the terms and
conditions on websites you use?
14.3 18.8 22.3 40.2 1.8 2.7
How often do you check permissions before
installing smartphone apps?
19.6 11.6 15.2 30.4 0.9 22.3
Table 1 Self-reported action frequencies (%)
ity, still 72% of individuals have never encrypted their emails. Only 7% claimed
to use email encryption consistently, and assuming our sample is somewhat rep-
resentative, this suggests that the vast majority of UK public email is open to
eavesdropping.
Despite the overwhelming concern claimed for privacy, with 92% agreeing
with its importance, individuals do not take actions to protect themselves. We
found little correlation between privacy opinions and action scores (correlation
coefficient ρ = 0.02), reflecting that just because a participant claims to value
privacy, it does not mean they act privately. Online privacy opinions also had
little correlation with action scores (ρ = -0.03), suggesting the existence of the
Privacy Paradox. Interestingly, we found no correlation between self-evaluations
and action scores (ρ = 0.06), which could indicate poor privacy self-awareness.
Potential reasons for these disparities include a lack of privacy awareness, the
inconvenience of using protective tools, or simply because individuals might not
associate certain actions with acting privately.
Remarkably, 8% of participants claimed to have used the PrivBrowse tool,
despite it being fictitious. We found these individuals cared less about both pri-
vacy and online privacy than average but evaluated themselves similarly private.
The group might have responded in this manner through a simple misconception
or due to social desirability bias.
4.4 RQ2: Demographic Comparisons
For our second research question, we investigated whether younger adults care
less about privacy, or are better able to protect themselves. We also studied how
different genders regard the topic, and whether those better educated in privacy
matters act more privately.
Whilst several age groups significantly differed in action scores, these did
not follow a clear pattern based on youth or age. Similarly, although we found
several significant differences for online privacy opinions and self-evaluations,
these did not follow a consistent trend. To investigate a direct distinction, we
split respondents into 18–45 and 46 and above groups. Those less than 46 would
have been born at least in 1970 and likely experienced the personal computer
revolution of the 80s onwards. Although not significantly, we found older indi-
viduals acted more privately, disclosed less information, and rated themselves
as more private. In contrast, younger adults reported to care more about both
privacy and online privacy. We went on to examine whether younger respond-
ents used privacy-protective technologies more frequently, and this was found to
be true. Although the action scores did not differ significantly, those under 46
years of age reported more frequent usage of all five technologies (browser history
erasure, browser privacy plug-ins, data encryption, Tor and email encryption).
This could dispel the myth that age correlates with privacy concern, as although
older individuals acted more privately, those less than 46 use technologies more
frequently to protect themselves.
We continued by studying whether gender, education or computer usage
affected privacy perceptions. Regarding gender, we found women to be signific-
antly more confident than men (x¯ = 1.7 vs x¯ = 2.1, p = 0.01) through their
self-evaluations. Curiously, this did not translate into lower female action scores,
with men faring better than women. This appears to support earlier work by
Sheehan [30] which found that men are more likely to act to protect their privacy,
represented by our male respondents also disclosing less data. Whilst significant
differences were not seen through education level, those with Master’s degrees
acted most privately, disclosed the least information, and cared most about both
privacy and online privacy. Those who used PCs during their employment had
better action scores, disclosed less data, cared more about privacy, and evaluated
themselves as more private, though these differences were not significant in our
study.
To further analyse whether knowledge affects privacy perceptions, after our
public survey was completed we surveyed an additional 25 cybersecurity re-
searchers. 80% of this sample were male, 80% were under 36, and all were UK
residents with at least a Bachelor’s degree. We found the researchers’ action
scores were significantly more private than the general public (x¯ = 2.4 vs x¯
= 2.7, p < 0.01), and they revealed fewer optional demographics. Education
clearly has an effect: those with Master’s degrees acted most privately in the
public sample, with cybersecurity researchers disclosing even less data. This
might suggest that privacy awareness campaigns and training sessions would be
beneficial in encouraging the public to act more privately.
4.5 RQ3: Data Disclosure Behaviour
In answering our third research question, we investigated how data disclosure
behaviour correlates against privacy opinions, actions, and self-evaluations. All
three optional demographic queries possessed a “Prefer Not to Say” option and
privacy should be a salient thought when completing a survey on the topic.
In spite of this, 96% of participants willingly disclosed their marital status,
suggesting that individuals do not treat these details privately. Whilst 12% of
respondents revealed their Twitter handles, only 13% explicitly chose not to.
The remaining individuals claimed to not possess an account, and whilst this
might be an anti-disclosure tactic, if more respondents used Twitter then the
disclosure rate would likely increase. Since the handle enables direct contact with
the user, it is still concerning that over one in ten participants would needlessly
reveal this information. 56% of respondents chose to reveal their employer, with
this figure increasing to 84% when including the unemployed and retired. On
modal average, 72% of respondents disclosed two items of data needlessly, with
over 99% revealing at least one piece of optional information. Assuming our
sample is somewhat representative, the UK public are very willing to disclose
their personal data.
Fig. 1 Rating of online privacy importance as compared to disclosure behaviour
We finally studied the effect that opinions and self-evaluations have on data
disclosure. We discovered that both privacy opinions (correlation coefficient ρ
= 0.06) and online privacy opinions (ρ = 0.15) bore little correlation with the
amount of data disclosed, with the latter comparison shown above in Fig. 1. The
heatmap suggests that regardless of how much an individual might profess to
value online privacy, they are just as likely to divulge optional demographic in-
formation. Self-evaluations (ρ = 0.06), were also found to have a minimal effect
on disclosure behaviour, suggesting individuals reveal data regardless of their
beliefs. Of greatest concern, reported action scores (ρ = 0.05) did not correlate
with data disclosed, reflecting that even those who claim to act privately need-
lessly reveal their information. Here we illuminate another angle of the Privacy
Paradox: not only do individuals report actions different to their opinions, they
disclose information needlessly even whilst describing themselves as private.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated the UK public’s perceptions of online privacy,
their use of privacy-protective tools, and how different demographic groups re-
gard the topic. We found that whilst the vast majority of participants claim to
value privacy, they do not act to keep their information safe. Although 93% of
respondents agreed with the importance of online privacy, fewer than half even
cleaned their browser history regularly. This might be due to insufficient privacy
education, apathy, or because respondents do not appreciate the risks they en-
counter in their use of online services [11] [24]. We saw that younger adults do not
necessarily care less about online privacy, in fact they use protective technologies
more frequently than their older counterparts. Education also played a strong
role: those with Master’s degrees acted most privately in the public sample, with
cybersecurity researchers disclosing even less data. Finally, we discovered that
information disclosure does not correlate with privacy opinions or reported ac-
tions. With 96% of respondents divulging their marital status and more than half
disclosing their employer with little need, the British public appear very willing
to reveal their personal information. In total, over 99% of individuals disclosed
at least one piece of data needlessly, with over one in ten revealing their Twit-
ter handle. No correlation was found between participants’ opinions and the
actions they took, validating the existence of the Privacy Paradox. We develop
the concept further to show that individuals disclose information needlessly even
whilst describing themselves as private.
Whilst we hope our research will assist others in analysing data disclosure,
we accept limitations to our work. Although our four selected cities provided
variations in population size and location, we did not survey all areas of the UK.
A more representative future work would cover cities in Scotland and Northern
Ireland, canvas a larger number of sites, and include rural locations in addition
to cities. Whilst we also do not consider 112 physically-surveyed respondents an
insignificant sample, this figure could be increased through the future use of a
mixed-mode survey including an online form.
With the Privacy Paradox receiving increased interest, there is much further
work to conduct in this area. Firstly, a similar survey could be conducted online
to examine whether individuals are more willing to disclose their data to a web
form or to a physical researcher. Secondly, the effect of privacy salience could be
studied against the level of information disclosure. We could conduct both a pri-
vacy survey and an unrelated poll to compare whether respondents disclose less
data when actively considering privacy. Thirdly, we could conduct a European
study to empirically compare privacy behaviour across different cultures. With
privacy laws stricter in some states, such as Germany, we could study whether
these respondents disclose less data than citizens of other countries.
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